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ON CLANDESTINE WARFARE*
ROBERT E. RODES, JR.**
On July 12, 1978, William Guillermo Morales was in an apartment in
Queens fashioning a bomb with which he hoped to make a contribution to
the independence of Puerto Ricn. Instead, the bomb exploded" prema-
turely, injuring Morales and engaging the attention of the police. In the
ensuing criminal proceedings, counsel for Morales argued in an able
brief that he should not be prosecuted because he was entitled to be held
as a prisoner of war. The court gave the contention its due consideration,
rejected it, and duly fed Morales into the normal processes of criminal
justice as they operate in the Eastern District of New York.1 The court
did not address itself to his claim that he had been refused necessary
medical treatment as a way of getting information from him.
On March 10, 1965, Osman Haji Mohamed Ali and another dropped
off twenty-five pounds of nitroglycrine in a Singapore bank. It blew up,
killing three people. Osman and his unnamed companion were tried for
murder and for violation of various arms control laws. They claimed to
be members of the Indonesian armed forces and therefore entitled to
prisoner of war status. The Privy Council, after lengthy discussion of the
relevant authorities, rejected their contention and affirmed their convic-
tions.2
On September 18, 1864, John Y. Beall with a party of Confederates
took passage on board the steamboat Philo Parsons at the Canadian
town of Sandwich, near Detroit. They took possession of the boat, in-
tending to use it in liberating Confederate prisoners held on Johnson's
Island in Lake Erie. Their plan miscarried. Two months later, Beall at-
tempted to derail a train near Buffalo. He was arrested at the railroad
station in Niagara Falls, N.Y., on the way back to Canada. He had a docu-
* This article and the suggested interndtional convention (Appendix I) and federal
statute (Appendix II were developed as -part of a colloquium sponsored by the Frances
Lewis Law Center of Washington and Lee University School of Law.
Valuable criticisms (some of which I have embodied in the text, others of which I have
argued with expressly in the notes or by implication in this article) were made by Pro-
fessors James E. Bond, John F. Murphy, and Alfred P. Rubin, and Major David R. Dowell,
my fellow participants in the colloquium and by Professor Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., and his
colleagues on the law faculty at Washington and Lee. To all of these I am grateful, and to
Lieutenant Colonel Henry J. Gordon, a colleague in a war course at Notre Dame, who went
over the draft conviction in an earlier stage.
** A.B. 1947, Brown University; LL.B. 1952, Harvard University; Professor of Law,
Notre Dame Law School.
United States v. Morales, 464 F. Supp 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Professor Alfred P.
Rubin kindly supplied me'with a copy of the brief presented by attorneys Michael E.
Deutsch and Jessee Berman on behalf of Mr. Morales.
I Al v. Public Prosecutor, [1969] 1 A.C. 430 (P.C.).
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ment signed by Jefferson Davis and Judah P. Benjamin attesting that he
was an Acting Master in the Confederate Navy, embarked on a warlike
mission. He was tried by a military commission in New York City for be-
ing a spy and for violating the laws of war. Despite an eloquent defense
by a prominent New York lawyer, he was condemned and hanged2
These cases illustrate the generally unreceptive attitude of the law
toward clandestine warfare. I mean by "clandestine warfare" any form
of combat in which the fighters escape detection by mingling with the
ostensibly peaceful population. I use this term because others are open
to misinterpretation. "Terrorism" is pejorative: one man's terrorist is
another man's freedom fighter. "Guerrilla warfare" often involves con-
cealment in the natural, rather than the social environment, hiding in
forests and mountains rather than appropriating the immunity of non-
combatants. "Underground" or "resistance" movements may be non-
violent.
Clandestine warfare, as thus defined, is not new, as can be seen from
Captain Beall's case. In recent years, however, it has gained new pro-
minence. It seems to be the only way a dissident group can hope to
prevail against the technological superiority of the modern industrial
state. Such covert activity is hard to combat within the aspiration to an
open society-an aspiration that many states genuinely cherish and
most states find it expedient to profess.
It seems that our moral judgements on clandestine warfare are more
nuanced and less severe than our legal judgments. We are able to distin-
guish between blowing up a tank and blowing up a school bus, between
machinegunning a police station and machinegunning a barroom. Most of
us honor the people on the Continent of Europe who resisted the Ger-
man occupation troops during the Second World War. The Irish
Republican Army (IRA), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
the forces that created the State of Israel in 1948, and those that af-
fected the transformation from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe in 1979 all have
both admirers and detractors. Even their detractors, however, see dif-
ferences between them and the Symbionese Liberation Army. The total
insensitivity of the law to these moral perceptions is, it seems to me, an
obstacle to any effort to humanize clandestine warfare.
What I intend to do here, therefore, is propose a substantial revision
of the laws governing clandestine warfare. First, though, by way of in-
troduction, I want to offer a more detailed typology of clandestine opera-
tions and measures to combat them, a few general reflections on the
laws of war, and a critique of those laws as they now stand. Following a
traditional and wise distinction in the law, I am separating questions of
what may be legitimately done in pursuit of a cause (jus in bello) from
questions of the legitimacy of the cause itself ('us ad bellum).4 In the
' 14 American State Trials 683, 683-85 (Military Comm. 1865).
See L. OPPENHEIM, 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 217-18 (7th ed. H. Lauter-
pacht 1952); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 5 (1971).
[Vol. XXXlX
CLANDESTINE WARFARE
following discussion, the methods of clandestine warfare should be con-
sidered from the standpoint of a person who believes in the cause for
which the clandestine force is fighting, while the countermeasures
should be considered from the standpoint of a person who believes that
the clandestine force should be rigorously suppressed.
I. PATTERNS OF CLANDESTINE WARFARE
Clandestine forces, like other forces, are fighting ultimately for some
kind of political objective. But the reason their operation is clandestine
is that they cannot hope to defeat their enemy in open combat. There-
fore, they must have for their immediate objective some other means of
accomplishing their political goals. Sometimes this objective is merely to
support a conventional force operating somewhere else. The clandestine
forces operating in German-occupied territory during the Second World
War played such a support role. But where there is no conventional force
to support, the clandestine force has to define its objective more subtly.
One possibility is to discredit the government in power, and thereby
gain adherents until the clandestine force can either transform itself into
a conventional force or directly supersede the government. This was
more or less the approach taken by the Irish Republicans of 1918-21, by
Castro in Cuba, by the Communists in Vietnam, and by the Sandinistas
in Nicaragua. If the strategy is properly executed, as it was in all the
cases mentioned, the clandestine force can make the government look
cruel and ineffective at the same time. Pursued far enough, this ap-
proach gives the clandestine force moral superiority over the govern-
ment. As Michael Walzer points out, when clandestine fighters achieve a
certain measure of public support, they become the legitimate rulers of
the country.'
Before this point is reached, however, a clandestine force may be
able to accomplish its purposes by making the cost of governing the
country so high that the government is willing to reach an acceptable
political settlement. Britain's decision to withdraw from Palestine in
1948 may be regarded as such a settlement. Other such settlements oc-
curred in places like Algeria, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, although in
each of these cases the clandestine force involved was in the process of
shifting over to conventional operations by the time a settlement was
reached. The IRA seems to be pursuing a similar strategy today, and the
PLO is attempting a variant of it that involves pressuring the interna-
tional community to pressure Israel, rather than trying to exert direct
pressure on Israel.
This kind of pressure shades off into another and far more reprehen-
sible variety where a political settlement is sought through terrorizing
the population into pressuring the government. This strategy is ter-
rorism in the strict sense, and seems entirely unacceptable morally. The
' M. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 194-96 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WALZER].
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lives of innocent people cannot legitimately be used as counters in any
political maneuver, however desirable its purpose.
Whatever they are trying to accomplish, clandestine forces have only
a limited range of devices available. These are used so reguarly that
they have become fairly familiar by now. In the countryside, the
clandestine force will try to disrupt the civil government of its adver-
sary by attacking and intimidating officials or members of the public
who cooperate with them. It will attack isolated units of the enemy's army
or police, and may try to put economic pressure on the enemy by de-
struction of the economic infrastructure: factories, highways, trains,
buses, and the like. Especially where a clandestine operation is support-
ing a conventional force, the clandestine force will try to disrupt the
enemy's war effort by interfering with his communications and logistical
support. This tactic is the mainstay of World War II movies.
Two additional devices are typical of the urban (as distinguished
from rural) clandestine force. One is the hostage-and-barricade situation
where a building or conveyance is invaded and defended by threats to
the lives of those caught inside. Negotiations are then entered into with
a view to providing various advantages to the captors, probably including
a clean escape, in exchange for a release of the hostages. There is no ob-
vious reason why this device should not work in the country as well as in
the city, but on the whole it has been used only in cities or in airplanes.
The other peculiarly urban device is the planting of bombs. The bomber
can either park a car with a bomb in it and walk away, leave a bomb in a
parcel as if by inadvertance, drop it into a trash receptacle, or shut it in a
public locker. It is harder to plant bombs in a rural setting: people leav-
ing parcels about-and especially people leaving cars about-are more
apt to be noticed. By the same token, in a rural setting there is less need
for bombs: it is easier to sneak up on someone, shoot him, and make a
getaway.
The urban devices tend to raise more moral problems than the rural
ones, because they are more apt to involve indiscriminate slaughter. The
hostages in an airline hijacking or building occupation are generally a
random group of peaceful citizens as are the people that get blown up
when a bomb goes off in a store, an airport, or a bar. To be sure, in-
discriminate slaughter is not unique to this kind of warfare. A National
Liberation Front (FLN) spokesman in Pontecorvo's film The Battle of
Algiers argued that leaving bombs around in shopping baskets is no dif-
ferent morally from dropping them out of airplaines as the French were
doing in villages occupied by the FLN: "Give us your bombers and you
can have our baskets."6 The argument is respectable, but not altogether
persuasive. In the first place, indiscriminate aerial bombardment is open
to moral objections of its own. Also, it seems to me that sitting at a bar
and leaving off a bomb to blow up your unsuspecting fellow-drinkers
I GILLO PONTECORVO-S THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS 121-22 (Solinas ed. 1973).
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represents a different kind of human insensitivity from dropping bombs
out of airplines. A potential victim will recognize an aerial bomber as an
enemy as soon as he sees it, whereas the bar bomber gains access to his
victim only by abusing the trust whichi peaceful citizens habitually place
in one another. That trust is so important and so fragile that we should
be reluctant to condone any abuse of it.
One way in which both rural and urban clandestine forces attempt to
gain legitimacy is by undertaking civil and criminal administration in
competition with the established authorities. For example, at one point
in The Battle of Algiers film, we see FLN officials performing a mar-
riage ceremony and congratulating the bride and groom on their
patriotism in bypassing the French authorities.7 At another point, we
see FLN gunmen administering summary punishment to a prominent
figure in the prostitution business who laughs at their demand that he
find another line of work.'
Assuming the functions of government in this way seems to be a
legitimate tactic. When it involves shooting people, however, it cannot
be considered apart from the more problematical tactic of assassination.
It has generally been regarded as immoral to wage war by assassinating
one's enemies. A contrary argument is that it is incongruous for people
who take up arms in a just cause (again, the legitimacy of the tactics is to
be evaluated on the assumption that the cause is just) to kill policemen
and soliders who are not to blame for the injustices that give rise to the
war, while the leaders, landlords, businessmen, and officials, who really
are to blame, enjoy the immunity of noncombatants.
This argument may support assassination as a form of punishment,
but it does not support assassination as a military tactic. The justifica-
tion for killing your enemy in war is that he is actively engaged in using
force to prevent your attainment of your military objectives, not that his
continued existence is an obstacle to your political goal. Killing a corrupt
official or an oppressive landlord is like killing the head of the prostitu-
tion ring, not like killing an enemy soldier. Such killing is capital punish-
ment rather than warfare, and the moral questions it raises must be
judged accordingly.
Most successful clandestine forces receive substantial support from
outside the state in which they are operating. This support includes
relatively secure bases, as well as a source of supplies. Sometimes this
support is given and received in defiance of the local government. This
seems to be the case with the PLO in Lebanon, as it was with them in
Jordan until the Jordanian forces expelled them. On the other hand, the
governments of Tunisia and Morocco generally acquiesced in the use of
their territory and resources by the FLN, as did the governments of
Zambia and Mozambique in the case of the Zimbabwean forces. The atti-
7 I- at 37-40.
8 Id- at 28-36.
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tude of the Costa Rican government toward the Sandinistas in Nicara-
gua seems to have been one of benign neutrality, that of the Sihanouk
government in Cambodia toward the Vietcong one of looking the other
way. Each of these attitudes poses its own problems for international
law.
II. COUNTERMEASURES
The first line of defense against a clandestine force is, naturally
enough, the criminal law. A person who shoots policemen, robs banks, or
blows up airplanes for political reason can be treated in the same way as
a person who does the same things for other reasons. This approach has
the advantage for the goverment of stigmatizing the clandestine fighter
as a common criminal. The recent hunger strikes in Northern Ireland il-
lustrate the tenacity with which this advantage can be clung to on one
side and resisted on the other.
In most democratic or would-be democratic societies, however, the
general criminal law is too weighted in favor of the accused to be really
effective against an organized and dedicated body of armed political
dissidents. The restrictions on investigation and arrest are too severe,
the standards of proof too exacting, the sentences too lenient. Jurors
may be drawn from a population sympathetic to the defendant's cause,
as in the Ku Klux Klan trials of the 1960s, or they may be subject to in-
timidation.
Accordingly, governments subjected to serious clandestine warfare
have tended to adopt enhancements of the criminal law.9 They create
new offenses such as belonging to illegal organizations (as in Northern
Ireland), parading in disguise (the anti-Klan laws adopted in some
American states), or violating curfews. They adopt new definitions of old
offenses such as sedition or conspiracy. They increase the penalties for
offenses such as illegal possession of firearms (the applicable penalty
was death in Kenya in the 1950s and Malaya in the 1960s). They adopt
procedural modifications such as the elimination of the jury in certain
cases in Northern Ireland.
Governments are usually reluctant to treat clandestine forces
according to the laws of war because by doing so they abandon the moral
and rhetorical position implicit in using the criminal law. They admit
that the clandestine force is something more than a gang of robbers or
cutthroats. On the practical level, though, there are advantages for a
government in using the laws of war. Government authorities can treat
a captured enemy as a prisoner of war without any trial, and can detain
him until the war is over. Given the tenacity of some clandestine forces,
this detention could last longer than the sentence he would receive
, The British refer to enhancements of the criminal law designed to deal with clandes-
tine operations as "emergency" measures.
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under the criminal law. Also, under the laws of war, a member of a
clandestine force can be held prisoner simply for being such a member,
without any showing that he has done anything to further the operations
of the force.
In addition, the laws of war themselves denounce certain actions as
criminal. Looting, torture, attacking noncombatants, and a number of
other activities are "war crimes" for which a combatant can be tried and
punished either by his own forces or by the forces that capture him. To
be sure, these atrocities are usually civil crimes as well, but the laws of
war allow for trial by military commission (similar to a court martial),
with a more expeditious and less defendant-oriented procedure than the
civil law is apt to afford.
In many cases, the laws of war will place the members of a clandes-
tine force in an ambiguous category of people called "unprivileged
belligerents."" This category covers people who are not noncombatants
because they are participating in the combat, but are not entitled to be
prisoners of war because they have not met certain conditions. These
conditions relate mainly to fighting openly; thus, the model case of the
unprivileged belligerent is that of the spy.
The consensus of modern scholarly opinion on the subject is that un-
privileged belligerency is not punishable under the laws of war. That it
is not a crime is shown by the rule that a spy who returns to his own
forces and later is captured in uniform cannot be punished for his
previous acts of espionage. Nor is the traditional execution of a spy
caught in the act provided for in the laws of war. Those laws do no more
than withhold their protection from the unprivileged belligerent, leaving
his captors free to deal with him under their municipal" criminal laws.
The handful of cases in the American courts dealing with the status
of an unprivileged belligerent appear to reject this scholarly consensus.
Captain Beall's case, referred to above, Major Andre's case from the
American Revolution,"2 and Ex parte Quirin" from the Second World
War all indicate that the laws of war furnish sufficient authority for try-
ing an-unprivileged belligerent by military commission and condemning
him to death without any reference to municipal law."
0 Baxter, So-called "Unprivileged Belligerency", Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28
Bart. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 342 (1951).
" In international law, the term "municipal" is used to designate the law of an in-
dividual state; not, as in other branches of the law, to designate the affairs of cities and
towns. The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that the term originally applied to internal,
as opposed to external, affairs at any level of government. Its special use for local govern-
ment dates from the nineteenth century, and seems to be based on Roman and Continental
usage.
,' 6 American State Trials 464 (Inquiry of General Officers of the Army 1780).
,I Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 36 (1942). See also Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429
(10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1014 (1957).
" See also LIEBER CODE, art. 13 (also known as General Orders No. 100, Instructions
for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in
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What I suspect is that the anomalous treatment of unprivileged
belligerents is a survival from a time when the legal obligation to spare
captured enemies in general was less clear than it is today. Ancient and
medieval people were not as impressed as we are with the rights of an
erring conscience. As they perceived themselves to be making war just-
ly, they perceived their enemies to be making war unjustly, and there-
fore to be liable to just punishment simply for participating in the war.
The strict logic of this perception was always mitigated by humanity in
the case of generous victors. As between knights, it was also mitigated
by the conventions of chivalry. As between professional soldiers, it was
mitigated by professional courtesy, and by the desire not to make the
common calling more dangerous than it had to be. When these motiva-
tions coalesced into a general rule of sparing all captured enemies, the
case of the unprivileged belligerent, to whom these motivations did not
generally apply, remained as a somewhat inexplicable exception. In the
case of clandestine warfare, the exception applies more broadly than the
rule.
As clandestine war becomes serious, the government is apt not to
content itself with measures against known belligerents. Often persons
suspected of being members, or even sympathizers, of the clandestine
enemy are subjected to "preventive detention." Within the past decade,
the governments of Northern Ireland and Quebec, to name only the two
places where there has been the most press coverage, have taken this
step. In both of these cases, detention was authorized by statute."6 It ap-
pears, though, that common law principles will authorize it if the danger
is imminent enough. This is the meaning of the provision in the Constitu-
tion for suspending the writ of habeas corpus, a provision that Lincoln
invoked several times during the Civil War. Cases generally have held
that the courts may look into the seriousness of the emergency, but not
into the propriety of detaining a particular person while the emergency
is going on.'6
Where the clandestine force has general support within the popula-
tion, or where it is drawn from a recognizable minority, the government
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3-23 (D. Schindler & J. Toman 1981) [hereinafter cited as
LIEBER]. Some of these authorities assimilate the unprivileged belligerent to a war criminal.
Others, notably the U.S. DEPT. OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, §§ 77, 82 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as AFM], indicate that he is not a criminal, but may be punished, even executed, in
order to enhance the risks of unprivileged belligerency. See United States ex rel. Wessels
v. McDonald, 265 F. 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1920). Note in this connection that Washington advisedly
ordered Andr9 to be put to death "ignominiously" by hanging instead of honorably by
shooting, and that he was criticized for his order.
,1 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, § 10 sched. 1; War
Measures Act, CAN. REV. STAT. C. W-2 (1970); Public Order (Temporary Measures) Act, 1970,
19 Eliz. 2, c. 2 (Canada).
"' C. ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 18-26 (expanded ed.




will often resort to some form of collective or vicarious punishment. Col-
lective fines, such as the British used in Cyprus in the 1950s, and puni-
tive curfews, such as they used in Malaya, are among the least drastic of
such punishments. A government can apply collective punishments to
particular villages where clandestine activity is in evidence, and so lead
villagers not strongly attached to the clandestine fighters' cause to come
forward with information. At the same time, the punishments are not
sufficiently severe or sufficiently unfair to make an enemy out of some-
one who was not one to begin with.
Destruction of property is a more severe measure. Blowing up
houses has been a favorite measure of the Israeli forces when they are
attacked from Arab villages. Burning of farms was a similar favorite of
the British in South Africa in 1900-02.1' These measures are harsh, but
they would seem to be morally acceptable given sufficient provocation.
The same cannot be said for the taking and execution of hostages
and reprisal prisoners. A hostage is taken to secure the future behavior
of his neighbors; a reprisal prisoner is taken as punishment for
something the neighbors have already done."8 In either case, the
misbehavior of the community to which a person belongs is claimed as a
warrant for putting him to death regardless of his personal involvement
in such misbehavior. Although this reasoning violates fairly clear-cut
moral principles,19 it was recognized through World War 11,21 being final-
ly outlawed by the Geneva Conventions of 1949.21
Akin to hostage taking, and probably open to the same objections, is
placing prisoners of war or civilians in positions of danger in order to
discourage attack. The best known example is the British project for
placing Boer civilians on trains in the hope that the Boer commandos
would not blow them up.2 An earlier and less familiar example is Sher-
man's coping with a primitive version of the booby trap on the highways
of Georgia by marching Confederate prisoners at the head of his
columns.' The British did a good deal of debating over the morality and
legality of their train project, and eventually gave it up. Sherman
1 See generally S. SPIES, METHODS OF BARBARISM? (1976) [hereinafter cited as SPIES].
"The distinction between hostages and reprisal prisoners is established in The
Hostages Trial (United States v. List and others), 8 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals
34 (1949) (United States Military Tribunal, Nuremburg).-
"' WALZER, supra note 5, at 216-22.
0 The Hostages Trial, 8 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals at 61-65.
1 Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, arts. 3, 33-34; 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter cited as
Convention IV]; Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13, 5
U.S.T. 3376, TJI.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as Convention II] gives
the same protection to prisoners of war.
' SPIEs, supra note 17, at 103-08, 240-44 & passim. The same device was used by the
Germans in 1870. SPIES, supra note 17, at 104. See also WALZER, supra note 5, at 17 (similar
English war tactic).
13 W. SHERMAN, 2 MEMOIRS OF GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN 194 (1875).
19821
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
justified his use of prisoners by pointing to the illegality of the device to
which he was responding: he characterized the use of booby traps as
"not war but murder." As it happened, no Confederate prisoners were
injured by his expedient, because their presence stopped the traps from
being set. Using prisoners in this way was forbidden by the Geneva Con-
vention of 1929, and the 1949 Conventions extended the prohibition to
civilians.24
Some restrictions on the general population are not called punish-
ments because military necessity rather than collective wrongdoing is
called on to justify them. The result still may be as harsh as punishment,
if not harsher. An example is the system of curfews and free fire zones
developed by the American forces in Vietnam. The object of such a
system is to limit the movements of innocent people in such a way that
anyone found abroad in certain times and places may be presumed
without inquiry to be an enemy and so may be shot out of hand.
While the curfew system was heavily used in Vietnam, it was not in-
vented there. The inventor seems to have been the Spanish general
Valeriano Weyler (1838-1930), an admirer of Sherman, who set out to
suppress a rebellion in Cuba in 1896. He ordered that all inhabitants of
rural areas outside the lines of fortified towns be concentrated within
the towns occupied by troops at the end of eight days. All individuals
who disobeyed, or were found outside the prescribed areas were to be
considered rebels and judged as such.2 The other leg of Weyler's pro-
gram, the concentration of the rural populace in fortified locations, was
picked up by the British in the Boer War, and so gave rise to the term
"concentration camp."26 Whether rounding up civilians and placing them
in such camps is an effective technique has been debated. The policy cer-
tainly had something to do with the surrender of the Boers in 1902, but
probably more because their families were succumbing to unsanitary
conditions than because their troops were more vulnerable without
civilian support. It might be added that whatever the concentration
camps did for the war effort they became a lasting obstacle to the peace.
Places where scattered civilians can be brought together and watch-
ed have not been called concentration camps since the Nazis appro-
priated the term for other purposes. The practice, however, has surviv-
ed the terminology. The United States used "relocation centers" during
the Second World War to bring together Japanese-Americans and "se-
cure hamlets" during the Vietnam War to bring together Vietnamese
peasants. This kind of relocation of civilians has been restricted, but not
2 Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1929, art. 9, 47 Stat. 2021,
T.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter cited as 1929 Geneva Convention]; Convention
III, supra note 21, art. 23; Convention IV, supra note 21, art. 28.
' SPIES, supra note 17, at 148, 296; WALZER, supra note 5, at 102.
2 SPIES, supra note 17, passim.
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entirely forbidden by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977-Proto-
cols.Y
A final measure against clandestine forces -one of complete desper-
ation, it seems to me -is to destroy their environment (as by defoliants)
or their food supply (as by burning crops). Needless to say, the victims of
such measures are not all enemies; indeed, many of them are not yet
born. Large-scale environmental destruction and intentional destruction
of supplies needed by the civilian population for survival are both forbid-
den by the 1977 Protocols.'
III. THE APPLICABLE LAW
Treating these moves and countermoves as 'a form of warfare
invokes upon them a venerable and growing body of legal material
known as the laws and customs of war. These laws and customs grew out
of ancient and medieval practice - a combination of chivalry, bombast,
and Realpolitik with a touch of Scholastic theology. They were reworked
by Renaissance and Enlightenment scholarship, especially that of Hugo
Grotius (1583-1645), whose De Jure Belli ac Pacis assembled all manner
of classical material and critiqued it in the light of Christianity and
natural law. Another reworking resulted from the codification move-
ment of the nineteenth century. In 1863, Abraham Lincoln promulgated
for the Union Army a code prepared by the Prussian scholar Francis
Lieber, then a professor at Columbia. Lieber's work influenced a number
of later compilations, culminating in the one adopted by an international
conference at the Hague (1899 and 1907). These Hague Regulations were
substantially reworked and expanded at Geneva in 1949 to reflect the
liberal humanitarianism of the immediate postwar years, and again in
1977 to reflect the ideological standoffs of contemporary world politics.
A handful of cases from different periods, plus the voluminous war
crimes trials following the Second World War, complete the list of major
sources. The impact of most of this material on clandestine warfare
ranges from problematic to irrelevant.
A. Per sons entitled to Combatant Status
Legitimate belligerency depends on the status of the war and the
status of the persons fighting. Grotius and his predecessors taught that
" Convention IV, supra note 21, art. 49; Protocol 11 Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, signed June 10, 1977, 16 INTL LEGAL MATERIALS 1442 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Second Protocol].
I' Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, signed June 10,
1977, 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1391 (1977) [hereinafter cited as First Protocol]; Second
Protocol, supra note 27, art. 14. For some reason, the Second Protocol does not contain a
prohibition of environmental damage as the first does. But both contain an analogous pro-
hibition of releasing dangerous forces by damaging dams, dykes, or nuclear installations.
First Protocol, supra, art. 56; Second Protocol, supra note 27, art. 15.
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only a sovereign could lawfully make war except to repel an immediate
invasion. War is an exercise of the God-given power to provide for the
common good and to punish offenders. Only those on whom God has
bestowed that power may exercise it. This principle has generally been
modified in practice by bestowing "belligerent status" on insurgents or
other groups able to exercise governmental authority over substantial
territory. The Confederates in the American Civil War, for instance,
were treated this way.
The law is clear that recognition of belligerent status does not imply
any recognition of political status for any purpose besides the war.
Nevertheless, established governments have been reluctant to attach
belligerent status to their enemies. Thus, the French went all through
the Algerian war without officially accepting the belligerent status of
the FLN.'
The applicable international legislation-the Hague Convention of
1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the two Geneva Pro-
tocols of 1977- is not much help on this point. The Hague Convention ap-
plies only to wars between signatories; the Geneva Conventions apply
also to a war between a signatory and another power "if the latter ac-
cepts and applies the provisions thereof."30 What constitutes a "power"
within the meaning of this language is no clearer than what constitutes a
belligerent. The British Privy Council has held, probably correctly, that
even if these Conventions apply to a war they cannot oblige a state to
give Geneva prisoner of war status to one of its own nationals.3' The Con-
ventions contain a provision applicable to "armed conflict not of an inter-
national character" but the obligations it imposes are minimal.32
The first of the two 1977 Protocols applies to any war governed by
the 1949 Conventions, and to revolts against racist or colonialist
regimes.' The latter provision seems a backward step, because it makes
what a person may lawfully do in fighting a war (jus in bello) depend on
the justice of his cause (jus ad bellum).4 Any hope for human decency in
"FRALEIGH, The Algerian Revolution, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 179,
196 (Falk ed. 1971).
1 Hague IV, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 2, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter cited as
Hague]; Geneva Convention Relative to Wounded and Sick, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T.
3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as Convention I]; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Wounded and Sick in Naval War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. 3663, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter cited as Convention II]; Convention I, supra note
21, art. 2; Convention IV, supra note 21, art. 2.
'1 Koi v. Public Prosecutor, [1968] A.C. 829 (P.C.).
Convention I, supra note 30, art. 3; Convention H, supra note 30, art. 3; Convention
Ill, supra note 21, art. 3; Convention IV, supra note 21, art. 3.
"3 First Protocol, supra note 28, art. 1, § 4. There is a further requirement that the
revolt constitute an exercise of the right of self-determination on the part of the population
concerned. Thus, the occasional case where settlers' or expatriates take the field to resist
conciliatory moves by the home government would not be covered.
" See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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warfare depends on a separation of these two kinds of legitimacy.
Everyone is convinced (or claims-to be) of the justice of his own cause
and the injustice of his enemy's. A right that is available only to an
enemy with a just cause will be available to no one at all.
The second 1977 Protocol applies to insurgent forces that control
specific territory.' It seems not to add anything significant to the tradi-
tional criteria for belligerent status. It will not apply to the typical
clandestine force, which operates in territory controlled by its adver-
sary- otherwise, it would not need to be clandestine.
The legal status of the individual combatant in clandestine warfare
is even more problematical than the legal status of the war. Even in a
legitimate war, clandestine fighters are apt to be treated as unprivileged
belligerents. Lieber's 1863 code provided that intermittent fighters who
resume their civilian status between engagements are to be "treated
summarily as highway robbers or pirates.""' The Germans in the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870 took the same position with regard to francs-
tireurs, including under that description any fighter who was not official-
ly mustered or commissioned by the fighter's government. 7 The only ex-
ception they recognized was the levde en masse, or spontaneous rising
of the populace of an invaded district to resist the invader.
The Hague Convention of 1907 was less restrictive than Lieber or
the Germans. It required for legitimate belligerency only that the troops
in question be under responsible command, wear a fixed sign recogniz-
able at a distance, carry arms openly, and conduct their operations in ac-
cordance with the laws and customs of war3 These four requirements
were repeated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949.11 Note that while the
requirements do away with the unprivileged status of the intermittent
or self-appointed fighter, they still impose standards of overtness that a
typical clandestine force cannot meet. Note also that an individual
fighter is unprivileged if the force to which he belongs violates the law
of war, even if he is not implicated in the violation. The first 1977 Pro-
tocol relaxes the rules still more." To be eligible for prisoner or war
status if captured, it requires only responsible command, open posses-
sion of arms while in the presence of the enemy, and the existence of a
disciplinary system that will enforce the laws of war.
These criteria for privileged belligerency are inadequate. It is clear
I Second Protocol, supra note 27, art. 1.
U LIEBER, supra note 14, art. 82.
" M. HOWARD, THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 251-56, 377-81 (1962).
U Hague, supra note 30, art. 1. Cf. International Declaration Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War, Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, art. 9, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CON-
FLICTs 25, 28 (2d rev. ed. D. Schindler & J. Toman 1981).
" Convention-I, supra note 30, art. 13; Convention HI, supra note 30, art. 13; Conven-
tion I, supra note 21, art. 4.
1 Convention I, supra note .30, art. 43-44. The language requiring, an internal
disciplinary system does not explicitly make it a condition for privileged belligerency. I
would read it, however, as implicitly having that effect.
1982]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
that the rules, even with the latest relaxation, do not recognize the
legitimacy of all the people and operations that most of us are willing to
respect. Remembering the all-important distinction between Jus ad
bellum and jus in bello,41 we must test the adequacy of the rules by ask-
ing if they allow all the conduct we are willing to approve of in a cause
we consider just. Leftists can think about the Sandinistas in Nicaragua
or the blacks in South Africa, rightists about fighting the Soviets in
Afghanistan, Irish nationalists about the IRA, pro-Israelis about the
Stern Gang, pro-Arabs about the PLO, and most Americans about the
French underground in the Second World War. Most of us in one or
another of these cases would be prepared to honor people who chose to
go to war even if they could not control territory, wear uniforms, or get
at their enemies without concealing their arms.
B. Persons Subject to Attack
Until the 1977 Protocols, the immunity of noncombatants from at-
tack was more an assumption than a matter of specific legislation. The
Protocols put a few of the governing principles on paper, but there is
still a lot left to custom. Putting custom and the Protocols together with
a few other pieces of legislation, we find that the following principles
presently govern the legality of particular attacks:
(1) assassination is not a legitimate means of warfare; 2
(2) noncombatants may be put at risk only if necessary to
mount an attack on a "military objective;"43
(3) indiscriminate attacks on groups of people are forbidden;"
(4) attacks for the purpose of terrorizing civilians are forbid-
den;"
(5) weapons that cannot be limited in their effect (e.g., mass
destruction nuclear weapons or clouds of poison gas) are for-
bidden."6
'1 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
42 E.g., LIEBER, supra note 14, art. 148; A.F.M., supra note 14, § 31.
E.g., First Protocol, supra note 28, arts. 48, 52; Hague, supra note 30, arts. 24-28; IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers
Incurred by the Civilian Population (1956), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
187-93 (2d rev. ed. D. Schindler & J. Toman 1981) [hereinafter cited as I.C.R.C.]
" E.g., First Protocol, supra note 28, art. 51, §§ 4-5; I.C.R.C., supra note 43, art. 6; G.A.
Res. 2675, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 13) 292, U.N. Doc. A12675 (1970); G.A. Res. 2444, 23
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 12) 164, U.N. Doc. A11748 (1968).
," First Protocol, supra note 28, art. 51, § 2; Second Protocol, supra note 27, art. 13, § 2;
I.C.R.C., supra note 43, art. 6.
4' E.g., First Protocol, supra note 28, art. 51, §§ 4(b-(c); Geneva Protocol Relating to
the Prohibition of Poisonous Gases, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65; G.A. Res. 2603A, 24 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 12) 226, U.N. Doc. A/1836 (1969); G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 8) 236, U.N. Doc. A/1063 (1961); I.C.R.C., supra note 43, arts. 14-15. For an analysis of




While these principles are often disregarded, they are hard to
disagree with. Unfortunately, they are not always easy to interpret. I
suggested above that shooting a person guilty of specific oppressive con-
duct may be different from using assassination as a means of warfare.
The law offers no criterion for applying this distinction. Nor does it offer
a way of telling who is a noncombatant. The Battle of Algiers film has
the FLN begin their campaign by an indiscriminate shooting of police-
men. Now, it must be conceded that policemen wear uniforms and play a
major part in fighting against clandestine forces, but does that make a
policeman a combatant when he is' directing traffic of helping old ladies
across the street? The law provides no guidance on the point.
Or consider the actual military forces engaged in fighting the
clandestine force. Is every member of those forces a combatant twenty-
four hours a day, seven days a week? Under Lieber's code, an enemy
soldier is a legitimate target only when an actual engagement is taking
place.4' We have tacitly (though not by express legislation) abandoned
this restriction in more recent times. The modern idea is pretty much
that an enemy soldier is a legitimate target any time, and a worker
engaged in directly supporting the war effort is a legitimate target at
least when he is at work .4
Even if we assume that this level of targeting is acceptable in con-
ventional warfare, in the peculiar circumstances of clandestine warfare,
it seems too harsh. In conventional warfare there is a line of battle. The
combat soldier may be subject to attack whenever he is on the line, but
he is given a respite from time to time. The civilian behind the lines may
be subject to aerial attack, but he generally knows when enemy planes
are coming and when they have gone. The prospect of being killed
anywhere anytime by anyone is more of a strain than anyone, whether
combat soldier or civilian, is under in a conventional war. The laws
governing clandestine warfare should provide the equivalent of a place
behind the lines.
The definition of military objectives also raises problems for
clandestine warfare. A long tradition dictates that hospitals, museums,
churches, schools, and the like are not to be attacked except in case of
urgent necessity (as when the Germans holed up in the abbey of Monte
Cassino). This tradition has been elaborately restated in such documents
as the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Wounded and Sick and the 1954
Hague Convention on Cultural Property. Other more general pieces of
legislation forbid the bombardment of undefended cities and towns. The
relevance of these provisions, however, is pretty well limited to the
situation their framers had in mind-that of advancing conventional
forces. Not until 1977 did a piece of international legislation purport to
give a general definition of military objectives:
47 LIEBER, supra note 14, art. 69.
"a WALZER, supra note 5, at 145-46.
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Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage.49
It does not seem to me that clandestine forces can be expected to abide
by such a limitation as this. Their objective is to harass the government:
if they do it by wrecking property instead of people, that is probably the
most we can ask of them. I would not try to impose any legal restrictions
beyond the traditional immunities of hospitals and cultural property and
the recently enacted provisions for protecting the environment.
C. Countermeasures
Some of the countermeasures discussed above are forbidden by in-
ternational agreements in any wars to which such agreements apply.
Hostages, collective punishments, reprisals, and the placing of civilians
or prisoners of war in such a way as to shield particular objects from at-
tack are all forbidden by the Geneva Conventions of 1949.10 The first
1977 Protocol adds a prohibition of environmental damage, and both Pro-
tocols forbid destruction of means required by the civilian population for
survival (e.g., food, shelter, fuel)."1 The second Protocol forbids wholesale
transfers of civilians (i.e., concentration camps) except for their own pro-
tection for "imperative military reasons.
'52
On the whole these prohibitions seem legitimate. I think, though,
that vicarious or collective punishment might be allowed to the extent
that it is limited to fine or detention, and is not applied except in a com-
munity whose members are collectively failing to cooperate in the sup-
pression of the clandestine force. As to the wholesale transfer of
civilians, on the other hand, I think the present legislation is too per-
missive. In the first place, one ought to be wary of the "own protection"
excuse; it was used by the British in the Boer War to support their con-
centration camps. It is easy to believe that no greater evil can befall the
local populace than to lose the benevolent presence of our military forces
and encounter the vicious soldiery of our enemies, but the local populace
" First Protocol, supra note 28, art. 52, § 2; I.C.R.C., supra note 43, art. 7; Resolution
on the Distinction Between Military Objectives and Non-Military Objects in General and
Particularly the Problems Associated With Weapons of Mass Destruction, Sept. 9, 1969, In-
stitute of International Law, § 2.
So Convention I, supra note 30, art. 3 (hostages); Convention II, supra note 30, art. 3
(same); Convention II, supra note 21, art. 33 (same); Convention IV, supra note 21, arts. 3, 34
(same); Convention III, supra note 30, arts. 13, 87 (collective punishments and reprisals);
Convention IV, supra note 21, art. 33 (same).
", See note 28 supra.
5 Second Protocol, supra note 27, art. 17. Convention IV, supra note 21, art. 49 men-
tions the subject of civilian transfer, but is less restrictive.
' SPIES, supra note 17, at 149.
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will not always agree. With regard to the "imperative military reasons"
language, I think Walzer would say, and be right in saying, that if we
have no better way to fight a clandestine force than to round up the
whole civilian population and lock it away, the war is over and the
clandestine force has won.' With these exceptions, I would favor exten-
ding the prohibitions as they now stand to cover the whole range of
clandestine warfare.
In our own country, and in other countries with similar legal
systems, some of the usual countermeasures are also restricted by
municipal law. As a general principle, the limitations on the investiga-
tion and trial of crimes apply here as elsewhere, unless they are
modified by the legislature or unless a basis is found for departing from
them. It appears that in extreme cases departures will be both politic-
ally and constitutionally acceptable, but not in all the cases the govern-
ment would wish. Thus, the suspension of habeas corpus, as provided for
in the Constitution, was accepted in Maryland in 1861. 5 It was gotten
away with in Hawaii in the Second World War, but was later declared il-
legal." In the Japanese Exclusion Cases, also from the Second World
War, the Supreme Court held that measures otherwise unconstitutional
might be upheld in cases of emergency. 7 The principle is hard to argue
with, but its application to the loyal and inoffensive Japanese-Americans
now seems so outrageous that it is hard to know whether the cases still
have any authority. Perhaps the lesson to be drawn from them is that if
the emergency is severe enough to support the proposed measure poli-
tically, it will support it constitutionally as well. It would follow that the
kind of measures taken by the British and Canadian authorities when
the need arises could also be taken in the United States even though
we have written constitutional limits and they have not. On the other
hand, the view that "national security," as a general matter, authorizes
police methods that would otherwise be illegal or unconstitutional has
not found favor.
Under American doctrine, as we have seen, civilians or enemy sold-
iers can be subjected to military courts and military law if they are
found spying or in arms. Otherwise, the rule is that if the civil courts are
open and able to function, they and their law must be used. 9 Whether, if
we had a serious clandestine force in this country, we would apply the
rule or the exception to it remains to be seen. I believe there is much to
be said for using the law of war in such a case.
" WALZER, supra note 5, at 195-99.
RSSITER, supra note 16, at 18-26.
,Id. at 54-59.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); RoSSITER, supra note 16, at 40-54.
5See text accompanying note 15 supra.
" Ex parte Miligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867).
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D. Neighboring States
For a state to harbor a clandestine force operating in a neighboring
state is regarded as an act of aggression against the neighboring state.
On the other hand, for the state in which the clandestine force operates
to pursue it into the state where it is being harbored seems to be regard-
ed as an act of agression against the harboring state. If the first rule is a
good one, the second makes no sense. It is possible to argue that the
South Africans are right to fight against the South-West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO) and easy to argue that they are wrong to do so.
But I cannot see that it is at all possible to argue that they are right to
do so in Namibia and wrong to do so in Angola. I cannot see that what
wrong they are doing in Namibia, be it great or small, is in any way
enhanced by their crossing the Angolan border to reach their enemy
where he has gone.
My point is that a state that harbors a clandestine force cannot claim
to be neutral in the fight between that force and the opposing govern-
ment. The duty of a neutral is clearly to intern any belligerent forces
that show up within its borders."0 Intentional failure to do this is incon-
sistent with neutrality, and, therefore, inconsistent with the claim to im-
munity that neutrals have. Angola, for good or ill, cannot claim to be
neutral in the fight between South Africa and SWAPO.
There is in international law a doctrine called "humanitarian inter-
vention" by which a state can intervene in a neighboring state if condi-
tions are bad enough." This doctrine was used by India in Bandladesh,
and by Tanzania in Uganda. It can also be used to support the so-called
wars of national liberation that are being carried on by clandestine
forces in various places. It is not clear how far this doctrine goes, and the
1977 Protocols, despite their general support for wars of national libera-
tion, disclaim any intent to expand it. But whatever the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention may justify in the way of support for clandes-
tine forces operating in a neighboring state, it does not justify claiming
the rights of a neutral while rendering such support.
In some cases, of course, the support of the harboring state for the
clandestine force is less clear: the harboring state may be more victim
than ally. This was the situation of Cambodia during much of the
fighting in Vietman; it is quite possibly the situation of Lebanon today.
The law seems to require that a neutral state take reasonable measures
to prevent breaches of its neutrality, but it does not shed much light on
what measures are reasonable or what should happen if a state does not
take them. The only clear precedent on the subject is an exchange of
notes between the British and American governments establishing that
the Canadians should not have crossed the Niagara River in 1837 to burn
Hague V, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 11, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540.
El WALZER, supra note 5, at 101-08.
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a boat that was running supplies from the American side to a group of in-
surgents on a Canadian island.2 This incident is a tenuous basis for solv-
ing the problems of the PLO in Lebanon, but there is not much else
available. It is clear that the American authorities should have stopped
the boat, and that the Canadians should have waited a reasonable time
-for them to do so before taking matters into their own hands. But it is
not clear that a neutral state must hazard the lives of its troops and
citizens in order to prevent breacheg of its neutrality, or that one
belligerent must exercise indefinite forbearance if the other one violates
the territory of a neutral with impunity but not with permission. In the
end, it would seem that a neutral ought to be able to preserve its
neutrality despite the use of its territory by a belligerent, but it can
hardly complain if the other belligerent takes preventive measures.
E. Occupation Rules
The law regarding the inhabitants of occupied territory takes them
entirely out of the fighting. They are supposed to conduct themselves as
peaceful citizens, and do nothing to hinder either the war effort of the oc-
cupying power or its administration of the occupied territory. Thus, the
resistance fighters in German-occupied territory during the Second
World War were not only iinprivileged belligerents, they were war
criminals. The Nuremberg tribunals, while they condemned the scope
and ruthlessness of the Germans' countermeasures, accepted the charac-
terization of the resistance movements as unlawful. 3 Later legislation
has restricted still further the permissible countermeasures, but it has
not changed that characterization.
This state of the law seems most unrealistic. It does not conform to
what the inhabitants of occupied territories do, to what we expect them
to do, or to what we honor them for doing. As long as they have com-
patriots or allies in the field, we expect them to give what support they
can by disrupting the occupying power and distracting its forces. Even if
they have no conventional force to support, we expect them to do what
they can to make government difficult enough to encourage a favorable
political settlement. Presumably, these expectations should be reflected
in the law.
IV. PROPOSALS
In proposing changes in the laws of war we need to pay more than
passing attention to what those laws are supposed to accomplish. The
2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-14 (1906).
The Hostages Trial (United States v. List and others), 8 Law Reports of Trials of
War Criminals 34,57 (1949) (United States Military Tribunal, Nuremburg); Baxter, The Duty
of Obedience to the Belligerent Occupant, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 235 (1951) disagrees with
this characterization of the law as of the time of the Second World War. He does not quite
persuade me.
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laws of war differ from municipal laws in the lack of impartial enforce-
ment by courts or police, and the relative insignificance of the unilateral
enforcement measures that are sometimes applied. The laws of war dif-
fer also from other provisions of international law because of the effort
of the intellect and the imagination needed to look at modern warfare
and keep thinking of law.
Let us look at the last point first. It reflects, I believe, a mindset
peculiar to modern industrial society." We are accustomed to seeing
organized and strenuous activities in technological terms-an effort to
accomplish a determined purpose through the discernment and applica-
tion of the available means. We are prepared to accept without much
argument Clausewitz' dictum that war is a way of imposing our will on
other people. It seems only common sense-like saying that civil engin-
eering is a way of imposing our will on the landscape. Indeed, we are
even comfortable with looking at law in the same way: witness the
popularity of Rocoe Pound's metaphor of "social engineering." But if law
and war are both ways of accomplishing things we want accomplished,
they are considerably different ways. If we take both Pound and Clause-
witz seriously, we will view law and war as an alternative technologies.
It will be hard to think of one as governed by the other.
In earlier times, was was regarded not as an alternative technology to
law, but as itself a legal transaction. People who went to war thought of
themselves as invoking a divine judgment of their causes. Many socie-
ties reached the point of formalizing this invocation long before they
were able to supersede it with other forms of trial. The ritual combat or
"trial by battle" survived in our legal system until relatively recent
times 5 as a witness to the primordial relation between litigation and
war.
This juridical understanding of war accounts for Grotius' insistence
that the right to make war belongs only to sovereigns." Paradoxically, it
probably accounts also for the privileged position given to wars of na-
tional liberation in the 1977 Geneva Protocols. 7 Where Grotius sees the
pursuit of justice as a prerogative of divinely appointed rulers, modern
theorists see it as a prerogative of peoples. But in both cases war is seen
as the pursuit of justice.
Seeing war in this way sometimes has an unfortunate effect on peo-
ple's attitudes toward their enemies. If in making war I am acting as an
agent of transcendent justice, then my enemy must be acting as an oppo-
" The maxim inter ar-ma leges silent is ancient, but its meaning is not that war is sub-
ject to no law. Rather, the phrase means that the law is subject to no law except the law of
war. LIEBER, supra note 14, arts. 40-41.
" Trial by battle was abolished by Act to Abolish Trial by Battle, 59 Geo. I, c. 46
(1819), after being involved in the celebrated case of Ashford v. Thornton, 1 B. & Ald. 405,
106 Eng. Rep. 149 (1818).
, H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE bk. 1, ch. 3, bk. 3, chs. 3, 20 (reprinted
1979) [hereinafter cited as GROTIUS]
67 First Protocol, supra note 28, art. 1, § 4.
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nent of transcendent justice. To the extent I cast myself in the role of
judge or policeman, I am casting my enemy in the role of criminal. Why
then do I have to treat him with respect when I fight him, and with
courtesy and consideration when I catch him?"
I think the way we have to solve these questions is to adopt a litiga-
tion model that conceives of the combatant as a litigant, not a policeman
or judge. This model gives scant warrant for anyone engaged in warfare
to despise his enemies. Both sides are suitors together before a judge
whose purposes are often inscrutable, and who is apt to give both to
them more justice than they bargained for. Abraham Lincoln, after four
years of civil war, had some inkling of what it means to submit a cause to
such a judgment:
Neither party expected for the war the magnitude of the dura-
tion which it has already attained.... Each looked for an easier
triumph and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read
the same Bible and pray to the same God; and each invokes his
aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should
dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from
the sweat of other men's faces, but let us judge not that we be
not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered-that of
neither has been answered fully.
The Almighty has His own purposes.... Yet, if God wills
that [the war] continue until all the wealth piled by the bonds-
man's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be
sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be
paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thou-
sand years ago, so still it must be said, "The judgments of the
Lord are true and righteous altogether." 9
I would put it that the first purpose of the law of war is to regulate
war as a legal transaction-to sustain the relation between two sides
that believe in the justice of their respective causes, but await a judg-
ment that may go hard with both of them. To this perception must be at-
tributed much of what is liturgical and ceremonial in the laws and
customs of war as well as much of the respect that the law calls on even
the deadliest of combatants to have for one another.
The second purpose of the law of war is to embody moral insights
into the manner in which war should be waged. The embodiment of
moral insights is a function of any set of laws. The absence of enforce-
ment mechanisms, judges, or police does not make that embodiment
superfluous. Our laws do not necessarily accord with our personal con-
ceptions of right and wrong, but they are the language of our community
See text following note 14 supra.
e' Abraham Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), reprinted in 5 LIFE AND
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 223, 224-25 (1907).
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conversation on the subject. 1 They represent our particular collective
ways of implementing general moral principles. As the scholastic
philosophers put it, positive law makes specific what the natural law (i.e.,
morality) leaves general. For instance, it is natural law that tells us not
to drive dangerously, whereas positive law tells us not to drive more
than forty miles per hour on a particular street. The principle that re-
quires me to respect the humanity and good faith of my opponent in war
is analogous to the principle that I must not drive dangerously, while the
rule that I must not make prisoners of war work in munitions factories is
like the speed limit.
Positive law also serves to confront the individual conscience with
the moral judgment of the community (civil rights laws are a better
analogy here than speed limits), and to make the results of advance
moral reflection available to a person with a snap decision to make in a
difficult moral situation-such as almost anyone fighting a war.
In short, where there is moral concern in a social context, there is an
important role for positive law, whether or not there is an enforcement
machinery. The law makes specific what the applicable moral principles
leave general. It treats questions in advance where there is hardly time
to treat them as they arise. The law brings the collective experience of
the community to bear on questions that very few people would want to
answer on their own.
The positive law cannot fulfill these functions unless it bears some
recognizable relation to people's moral perceptions of the situations it
purports to cover. As I have tried to point out, the positive law on the
subject of clandestine warfare does not generally bear such a relation.
As a result, it offers very little guidance to those who attempt either to
carry out or to suppress clandestine military operations, and both sides
seem to conduct their enterprise in a moral as well as a legal vacuum.
I am proposing here a reform in the positive law applicable to
clandestine warfare. The major part of my proposal is a draft interna-
tional convention. I use this form because it is the form taken by most of
the existing legislation on warfare. The objection naturally arises that
warfare between nations is a concern of the international community,
whereas war between factions in a single nation is not. This objection is
superficially persuasive, but I think in the end specious. Most modern
wars, whether national or international, involve ideological conflicts."
Only through the international community and its institutions can we
" See my THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE 34-35 (1976).
71 1 recall reading a remark of Professor Paul Freund that ideological warfare will one
day become as obsolete as religious warfare is now. Until that day comes, one can draw
useful analogies between ideological and religious wars. It is worth noting in this context
how much the renovation of international law under Grotius and his contemporaries or near




provide for relations between peoples and groups with different ideolo-
gical commitments.
I have said that positive law is the language of moral conversation in
society. These proposals are my own attempt to participate in that con-
versation. I have not taken into account the formidable political
obstacles to getting other and more important participants to adopt
them.
In developing these propbsals, I begin with what seem to me the four
basic principles of the laws and the morality of just war:
(1) the independence of jus in bello from the jus ad bellum;
(2) the condemnation of "perfidy," an ill-defined12 body of
underhanded tactics distinguished from "ruses," which are
acceptable;
(3) the immunity of noncombatants from attack;
(4) quarter for lawful combatants when captured.
These principles determine the problems of a reformed law of
clandestine war.
The first such problem is distinguishing lawful combatants from
gangsters or nut groups. Where a force either wears uniforms or con-
trols territory, we have some guarantee of the seriousness of its enter-
prise. If we abandon these criteria, we must develop others. I have
shown why I do not think the criterion of legitimacy used in the first
1977 Protocol is an acceptable way of doing this."3 What is needed is a
criterion not of legitimacy but of seriousness. Having a clearly stated ob-
jective may be one such criterion." Having a reasonably broad consti-
tuency may be another-this is analogous to the reasonable prospect of
success that is a criterion in classical just war theory. The scope of the
countermeasures evoked by a clandestine force may also indicate its
seriousness. Where a government imposes curfews and preventive de-
tention, and deploys combat troops, it can hardly contend that its adver-
sary is not serious."
The next problem is distinguishing lawful clandestine warfare from
perfidy. A clandestine force could hardly keep the field if it abstained
from everything regarded as perfidy under present-day law."6 We need
to redefine perfidy by resorting to the underlying moral insight that
bids us keep faith with even our enemy. I suggest that our treatment of
our enemy is based on the twofold presupposition that we are right and
u See text accompanying notes 40 & 41 supra.
73 I find no definition earlier than First Protocol, supra note 28, art. 37, which seems to
me too narrow.
"' A clearly stated objective is one of the elements of classical "just war" doctrine.
75 J. BOND, THE RULES OF RIOT 181-82 (1974).
7' Note the ambivalence of article 44 of the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 on the sub-
ject of perfidy. First Protocol, supra note 28, art. 44.
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he is in good faith. Since we are right, we are entitled not to be attacked.
We therefore have no obligation to make it easier for the enemy to at-
tack us. Hence, disguise, as such, is legitimate. On the other hand, since
the enemy is in good faith we may not deal with him in bad faith. We
must not abuse a personal encounter with him. We must not effect his
destruction by pretending to be his friend7 The distinction I want to
draw is pretty vague in practice, but I think legislation can le formu-
lated that will at least call attention to it, and perhaps give a modicum of
help in applying it.
A third problem is determining who is subject to attack. War is part
of the political process. Under our tradition, there are some human
rights that are immune from the political process. Accordingly, they
should also be immune from the tactical expediencies of war. That is, no
one can be legitimately attacked merely because it is expedient to attack
him. Some further justification has always been necessary.
The traditional basis for subjecting enemy civilians to the hazards of
war when it is necessary to do so is the solidarity of the enemy's com-
munity. Grotius alludes (with misgivings, to be sure)" to the argument
that since the sovereign has power over the persons and -property of his
subjects it is lawful for the sovereign's enemies to appropriate that
power as far as is necessary to pursue their legitimate purposes. Lieber
makes the same point in a more sophisticated and more democratic form:
It is a law and requisite of civilized existence that men live in
political, continuous societies, forming organized units, called
states or nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, suffer, advance
and retrograde together, in peace and in, war. The citizen or
native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the consti-
tuents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to
the hardships of the war. 9
Whatever force this argument has is missing in the typical clandestine
warfare situation, where the legitimacy and authority of the enemy
I was hard pressed on this point by my fellow participants in the Washington and
Lee colloquium. We ended with a standoff. I was not able to reduce this basic intuition about
human encounter to a more persuasive form; nor was I persuaded to abandon it. It is
perhaps helpful to note that the most difficult hypotheticals we came up with involved
gathering information. I sense some moral distinction between pretending to be someone's
friend in order to get close enough to kill him. To be sure, one can use the information to kill
him later, but there still seems to be a distinction. I find some support for it in AFM, supra
note 14, § 49: "In general, a belligerent may resort to those measures for mystifying or
misleading the enemy against which the enemy ought to take measures to protect himself."
One might be expected to protect himself against disclosing information more strictly than
against being killed by chance acquaintances or supposed friends.
18 GROTIUS, supra note 66, bk. 3, ch. 2.
19 LIEBER, supra note 14, arts. 20-21.
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sovereign are in issue and the two sides are drawn from the same com-
munity.'
It appears, therefore, that the typical clandestine warfare situation
provides only two legitimate bases for attacking an enemy. One is that
he is actively engaged in preventing the accomplishment of a legitimate
military objective. The other is that he has personally done something
wrong. These bases should be spelled out in the law.
In addition to specifying and articulating the applicable moral rules,
a revised system of laws for clandestine warfare should provide proce-
dures by which cases subject to the laws of war can be distinguished
from cases subject to municipal criminal law. It should also provide some
way in which clandestine forces may afford rudimentary procedural
justice to persons accused of wrongdoing, and some way, such as parole,
whereby clandestine forces can take captured enemies out of the war
without undertaking the impossible burden of holding them as prisoners.
Realistic guidance should also be provided for states adjoining
places where clandestine warfare is going on. A state that intentionally
supports and harbors a force, engaged in clandestine operations in
another state should be explicitly subjected to the responsibilities of a
cobelligerent. A state that wishes to retain the position of a neutral in
such a situation should not have to put its own forces at risk in someone
else's quarrel in order to do so. But if it cannot or will not prevent the
use of its territory by one belligerent, it can hardly complain if the other
belligerent operates in the same territory.
Finally, the occupation rules should be amended to establish clearly
the legitimacy of such actual practices as were considered right during
the Second World War 8
These are the purposes I have tried to accomplish in the following
drafts, one of an international convention, the other of a federal statute.
'0 Engels argues, I do not recall where, that in conditions of class warfare a member of
the enemy class may be attacked regardless of his personal responsibility for what his class
is doing. I find this argument morally tenuous. A social class does not have the same intrin-
sic necessity as a state.
1 See text following note 4 supra.
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Appendix I
DRAFT CONVENTION ON CLANDESTINE WARFARE
Article 1: Scope of this Convention
1. This Convention applies to clandestine warfare in or affecting the
territory of any of the High Contracting Parties. The term "clandes-
tine warfare" as used herein means armed conflict as carried out by
or against clandestine forces. A "clandestine force" is any force
whose members systematically attempt to gain military advantage
or escape hostile action by mingling with or .posing as noncom-
batants. Forces that are not clandestine forces are called "conven-
tional forces."
2. Reference in this Convention to the laws and customs of war, or to
rights and obligations thereunder, or to the rights and obligations of
governments, of neutrals, or of conventional forces shall be in-
tepreted, as far as the nature of the case admits, as if the Conven-
tions and Protocols enumerated in Section 3 of this Article were ap-
plicable, notwithstanding any provision in any of those Conventions
and Protocols limiting its application to cases of international con-
flict, to forces operating in definite territories, or to combatants
wearing a fixed sign or carrying arms openly. In cases to which they
apply in terms, those Conventions and Protocols are superseded only
to the extent they are inconsistent with this Convention. Without
prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, anyone entitled to be a
prisoner of war under the privisons of those Conventions and Pro-
tocols remains so entitled, and anyone entitled to be a prisoner of
war under this Convention is entitled to all the rights of a prisoner
of war under those Conventions and Protocols.
3. The Conventions and Protocols referred to in Section 2 of this Arti-
cle are:
(a) The Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land;
(b) The Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land;
(c) The four Geneva Conventions of 1949;
(d) The Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict;
(e) The two Protocols to the Geneva Conventions adopted in 1977
by the Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Develop-
ment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflict.
4. No person, force, or government shall be denied the benefits of this
Convention or exonerated from the obligations thereof on the
ground that he or it or any person, force, or government that he or it
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is opposing is not a party to this Convention, or has or lacks a par-
ticular status under international or municipal law.
Article 2.: Rights of Clandestine Forces and Their Members
1. Clandestine forces and their members shall be entitled to the benefit
of this Article if they fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subor-
dinates;
(b) that of conducting their operations in accordance with this Con-
vention and other applicable provisions of the laws and customs
of war;
(c) that of maintaining an internal disciplinary system which, inter
alia, shall enforce compliance with this Convention and other
applicable provisions of the laws and customs of war;
and at least one of the following conditions:
(d) that of operating in support of a conventional force currently in
the field, where the primary war effort against the enemy is be-
ing mounted by conventional forces;
(e) that of having a defined and publicly stated political aim, which
aim has substantial (though not necessarily majority) support
within the community in which the force operates, and which
its proponents could not realistically expect to implement
through peaceful political action. A government that opposes a
clandestine force with regular combat troops or by means of
emergency measures inappropriate in a peaceful society may
not deny that the political aim of that force has substantial sup-
port within the community.
2. Members of clandestine forces that fulfill the foregoing conditions
are entitled to be prisoners of war if they fall into the power of the
enemy. They are punishable for offenses against this Convention or
other applicable provisions of the laws and customs of war, but they
are not punishable under the municipal law of the enemy for any-
thing done in furtherance of the war effort of the force to which they
belong. Nor are they punishable for being found in disguise, for
failure to wear a distinctive sign, or for failure to carry their arms
openly.
3. Persons who belong to a clandestine force which they believe in good
faith to fulfill the conditions of Section 1 of this Article are entitled
to the benefits of Section 2, except that if the force does not in fact
fulfill the conditions of Section 1, its members may be, punished for
violations of the municipal criminal law.
4. Persons who knowingly become or remain members of a clandestine
force that does not fulfill the conditions of Section 1 are not entitled
to the benefits of this Article. They may be punished for violation of
this Convention, of other applicable provisions of the laws and
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customs of war, or of the municipal law. Unless when captured they
are wearing a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance and
carrying arms openly, they may also be dealt with under the laws
and customs of war concerning spies or other persons who penetrate
enemy territory in disguise with hostile intent.
5. As used in this Article, the term "municipal criminal law" does not
include emergency measures inappropriate in a peaceful society.
Article 3: Conduct of Hostilities by Clandestine Forces
1. Persons are not subject to attack by clandestine forces except as
follows:
(a) Members of the armed forces of an adversary are subject to at-
tack while on duty, or while in a fort or other military post with
a defended perimeter.
(b) Other armed persons are subject to attack while actively
engaged in hostilities against a clandestine force, or while
deploying or standing guard with a view to such hostilities. The
term "hostilities" as used in this provisions includes any at-
tempt to kill, injure, or capture the members of a clandestine
force, or to hinder them in the accomplishment of a specific
military objective.
(c) Persons whether or not armed, while they are actively using or
threatening to use force to implement measures or policies spe-
cifically denounced in a statement issued pursuant to condition
(e) of Section 1 of Article 2, are subject to attack as far as is
necessary to prevent their carrying out their purpose. Persons
participating in judicial proceedings are not actively using or
threatening to use force within the meaning of this provision.
(d) In the case of a clandestine force which is operating in support
of a conventional force, persons are subject to attack while at
work in manufacturing, communication, or transportation in-
dustries that directly contribute to the war effort of the adver-
sary against the conventional force being supported.
(e) Persons sentenced in accordance with Article 5 are subject to
attack for the purpose of carrying out the sentence.
The foregoing provisions shall not be construed to authorize attacks
on persons engaged in police or administrative functions of a kind
usual in peaceful societies.
2. Indiscriminate attacks on groups or crowds are forbidden, and are
not justified by the presence of persons subject to attack among the
groups or crowds in question. Attacks for the purpose of terrorizing
the general public or particular races, classes, or elements within the
general public are forbidden. It is forbidden to attempt to destabilize
a government or society by singling out for attack those persons and
officials who are most honest, decent, and effective in carrying out
peaceful governmental or social functions.
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3. Members of clandestine forces shall not fraternize with or endeavor
to gain the confidence of persons subject or potentially subject to at-
tack in order to facilitate attacks on such persons. Nor shall they at-
tack any person whom they have placed at a disadvantage by frater-
nizing with him or gaining his confidence.
4. In operations aimed at the capture or destruction of property,
clandestine forces shall take reasonable precautions to avoid harm to
persons not subject to attack.
5. Clandestine forces have the same obligations as conventional forces
toward medical, religious, and relief personnel; toward journalists;
toward women and children; toward cultural property; toward prop-
erty and locations devoted to the care of the wounded, the sick,
refugees, and children; toward supplies and services necessary for
the health and survivial of the civilian population; and toward the en-
vironment.
Article 4: Treatment of Prisoners of War by Clandesinte Forces
Except as provided in this Article, clandestine forces have the same
obligations as conventional forces toward enemies who surrender or
otherwise fall into their power. However, a clandestine force that has no
facilities for the indefinite detention of prisoners of war may require any
prisoner who has been detained for not less than forty-eight hours and
not more than a week to accept liberation on parole, and may refuse
quarter to any prisoner who will not give his parole as required. The
obligations of a prisoner so paroled and of his government or military
superiors are the same as if he had given his parole voluntarily and with
permission. No government or military superior may forbid any person
to give his parole under the circumstances provided for in this Article or
punish him for doing so.
Article 5: The Administration of Justice by Clandestine Forces
Clandestine forces shall not undertake to administer civil or criminal
justice in territory not under their effective control or over persons not
previously detained by them except in accordance with the following
provisions:
1. Clandestine forces shall not undertake the punishment of any crimes
except in the following categories:
(a) offenses against the laws and customs of war, including this
Convention;
(b) crimes against humanity, as defined by the Charter and juris-
prudence of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg
and other tribunals established pursuant to the same Charter;
(c) in the case of a war between sovereign powers, recognized as
such by the international community, where the clandestine
force is operating in support of conventional forces of one such
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power in territory occupied by an enemy power, treason on the
part of nationals of the power to which the clandestine force
belongs;
(d) serious crimes denounced as such by general laws in force
before the outbreak of hostilities and appropriate for the
government of a peaceful society;
(e) morally responsible discretionary acts involving the use or
threat of force to implement policies or measures specifically
denounced in a statement issued pursuant to condition (e) of
Section 1 of Article 2.
Except as provided in category (c) above, adherence to or support of
the enemies of the clandestine force or the conduct of hostilities
against the clandestine force shall not, as such, be punished.
2. Clandestine forces shall not undertake the punishment of any crime
in category (d) or category (e) above unless they can do so with
reasonable consistency and effectiveness, nor until they have pub-
lished a proclamation describing with reasonable clarity the crimes
they intend to punish.
3. Clandestine forces shall not undertake to give civil relief except to
the victims of crimes which they have undertaken to punish. They
shall not give civil relief affecting personal status or title to prop-
erty.
4. No person shall be punished for a crime other than one which he has
himself committed, nor until some responsible and impartial person
has investigated the case and satisfied himself that the one to be
punished is the one who actually committed the crime in question.
5. As part of the investigation provided for in Section 4, the accused
shall be provided with a written statement of the charges against
him or the opportunity to examine and copy such a statement. He
shall also be informed of some means by which he may contribute
relevant information to the investigation without placing himself in
the power of the clandestine force. No decision shall be made con-
cerning his case until such information has been received and impar-
tially considered.
6. After the investigation provided for in Sections 4 and5, no punish-
ment shall be inflicted until the charges and the sentence have been
made public.
Article 6: Conduct of Hostilities Against Clandestine Forces
Except as herein expressly provided, conventional forces conducting
operations against clandestine forces are subject to the same obligations
as when conducting operations against conventional forces, and govern-
ments endeavoring to suppress clandestine forces are subject to the
same obligations as governments maintaining a war effort against con-
ventional forces. The enumeration here of certain practices as expressly
forbidden shall not be taken to make other practices lawful.
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1. It is forbidden to attack or endeavor to suppress clandestine forces
by means of:
(a) perfidy;
(b) obtaining information through drugs or torture;
(c) taking hostages, placing prisoners of war or innocent persons in
positions of danger in order to discourage attacks, or, except as
provided in Section 2 of this Article, inflicting collective punish-
ments or other punishments not based on individual guilt;
(d) general destruction of the natural environment in order to
deprive clandestine forces of a place of concealment;
(e) starvation of the civilian population among whom clandestine
forces are concealed, or other measures seriously impairing the
health of the population;
(f) concentration camps, or other involuntary mass relocation of
civilians;
(g) indiscriminate bombardment of places and groups on the
ground that clandestine forces may be concealed in or among
them, provided that in cases of urgent necessity it is acceptable
to use non-lethal gas to control and sort groups consisting of
mingled clandestine forces and civilians;
(h) proclamation of "free fire zones" or other places in which
anyone found abroad is presumed without investigation to be
an enemy.
2. Notwithstanding any prohibition of collective punishment, in a
village, community, or neighborhood where a clandestine force is ac-
tive and appears to have at least the passive support of the majority
of the population, the government or other party endeavoring to
suppress the clandestine force may impose collective fines, may con-
fiscate or destroy property other than property affording essential
food, shelter, and clothing to the population, and may impose tem-
porary restrictions on the movement of the inhabitants.
3. Notwithstanding any prohibition of distinctions based on race, color,
religion, language, national or social origin, wealth, birth, or other
status, if it appears that a clandestine force and its adherents are
generally characterized by one or more of these criteria, the govern-
nient or other party endeavoring to suppress the clandestine force
may impose otherwise lawful conditions or restrictions on persons so
characterized without imposing them on others.
Article 7: Administration of Justice by Conventional Forces and
Governments
1. Conventional forces and governments in punishing war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and other offenses related to the armed
conflict, shall be bound by Article 6 of the Second 1977 Protocol to
the Geneva Convention of 1949 unless some standard more favorable
to the accused is in terms applicable. Clandestine forces, in dealing
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with territory under their effective control, or with persons pre-
viously detained by them, are subject to the same requirements as
conventional forces.
2. No person claiming the benefit of Article 2 shall be denied it without
a judicial determination that he is not entitled to it. Procedures for
the making of such a determination shall conform to Article 6 of the
Second 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949 unless some
standard more favorable to the accused is in terms applicable.
Article 8: Punishments and Reprisals
1. Punishments inflicted under Article 5 or Article 7 shall be propor-
tional to the offenses committed, and shall not involve mutilation,
disfigurement, sexual abuse, degradation, or irreversible impair-
ment of health. The death penalty shall not be inflicted on any per-
son under the age of eighteen, or who was under that age when the
offense was committed, or on any pregnant woman or mother having
dependent children. Corporal punishment shall not be inflicted by
any force or government that has adequate facilities for punitive
detention.
2. The taking of hostages and the infliction of reprisals upon indivi-
duals are forbidden. However, if a person is sentenced in accordance
with Article 5, Article 7, or the municipal law in a case provided for
in Article 2, the sentence may be suspended subject to conditions im-
posed on the person sentenced, his employer, the force to which he
belongs, or the government which he serves.
Article 9: Neutrality
The rights and obligations of neutrals in cases of clandestine warfare
are the same as in cases of warfare between conventional forces, except
as otherwise provided in this Article or in Article 10.
1. A clandestine force is not entitled to be recognized by neutrals as a
belligerent unless it is operating in support of a conventional force
that is so entitled. A clandestine force, unless it is recognized as a
belligerent, has no right to require that opposing forces be dealt
with according to the laws establishing the obligations of neutrals
toward belligerent forces. Except as provided in Article 10, a
government opposing a clandestine force has the right to require
that the clandestine force be dealt with according to those laws
whether or not it is recognized as a belligerent.
2. Whether or not a clandestine force is recognized as a belligerent, if it
fulfills the conditions of Article 2, its members, on falling into the
power of a neutral, are entitled to be interned rather than extradited
or prosecuted. If the clandestine force does not fulfill the conditions
of Article 2, its members may be extradited to be tried for violations
of the municipal criminal law (but not for offenses against the laws of
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war or this Convention), may be tried by the neutral in whose power
they are, or may be interned, at the option of the neutral.
Article 10: Neighboring States
This Article applies where a clandestine force uses the territory of
one state (called the "base state") as a base for operations within the ter-
ritory of another state (called the "state of operations").
1. If the base state is unable or unwilling forcibly to prevent the use of
its territory by the clandestine force, it shall so advise the state of
operations, designating, if it so desires, those parts of its territory
which the clandestine force will be free to use.
2. The state of operations may send forces into the territory of the
base state, or such part thereof as is designated in the notice pro-
vided for in Section 1 for the purpose of hostile action against the
clandestine force. A force taking advantage of this privilege shall
scrupulously respect the inhabitants of the base state and their prop-
erty.
3. For the base state to negotiate with the clandestine force regarding
limitations on the use of its territory or to- sell supplies to the
clandestine force at reasonable prices shall not be deemed a hostile
act against the state of operations if the notice provided for in Sec-
tion 1 of this Article is given and the privilege provided for in Sec-
tion 2 is accorded.
4. If the base state fails, after becoming aware of the presence of the
clandestine force in its territory, to give the notice provided for in
Section 1 of this Article or to accord the privilege provided for in
Section 2 of this Article, it may be regarded as a cobelligerent with
the clandestine force.
NOTES ON DRAFT CONVENTION
Article 1
1. I owe to Walzer the idea that the morally significant difference be-
tween clandestine and other forces is that clandestine forces en-
deavor to take advantage of the immunity of noncombatants,
2- This draft is not intended to cover the whole field; it is meant to fill
3. in gaps in the existing material. Therefore, the applicability of the
existing material must be spelled out.
4. At the colloquium, two objections were raised to this provision.
First, that it is inappropriate to hold a party to a convention to
which it has not adhered. Compare art. 96 of the First 1977 Protocol,
supra note 28, with its provision for voluntary adherence by a force
with no other international status. Second, that international law
should not be concerned with wars between groups that have no in-
ternational status, or wars over the internal affairs of a single state.
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I would respond that almost all of the actual wars to which this Con-
vention would apply if adopted will involve social, economic, poli-
tical, or ideological forces international in scope. It is idle to say
either that they do not concern the international community or that
the only agencies with power to legislate for the international com-
munity cannot deal with them. See note 71 and accompanying text
supra.
Article 2
1. (a)-(c) These are conditions for combatant status adapted from the ex-
isting material.
(d) World War II resistance forces are examples of forces that would
meet this condition. The existence of a conventional force in the field
is a sufficient guarantee of the seriousness of the war effort to make
other guarantees unnecessary.
(e) Having eliminated the requirements in the existing material that
the combatant be part of a uniformed force or a force pursuing a par-
ticular political goal or a force that controls territory, I need some
other basis for distinguishing a combatant from a gangster or a nut.
The requirement of a stated aim is derived from classical just war
theory. The reference to the scale of countermeasures comes from J.
BOND, THE RULES OF RIOT 181-82 (1974).
2- Combatants fall into three categories under international law. First,
4. there are those who are entitled to be prisoners of war. They may be
confined for the duration of the war, but are not punishable for
anything they do in furtherance of the war effort and not condemned
by the laws and customs of war. Second, there are war criminals,
who have done something contrary to the laws and customs of war.
They may be tried and punished by anyone who catches them,
whether on their own side or on the enemy's. Finally, there are the
"unprivileged belligerents" who have not necessarily done anything
against the laws and customs of war, but who do not fulfill the condi-
tions for being prisoners of war. See notes 10-14 and accompanying
text supra. The consensus of scholars is that international law
neither protects unprivileged belligerents nor provides for their
punishment, but simply leaves them to be dealt with under munici-
pal law. However, the American courts seem to hold that an un-
privileged belligerent, as such, is subject to trial and execution
under the laws of war, either as a punishment or as a way of increas-
ing the risk of this kind of belligerency. These provisions are intend-
ed to sort clandestine fighters among the three categories. I do not
want to resolve this disagreement between the scholars and the
American courts as to unprivileged belligerency; what I have in
mind is to leave the law on the subject where it stands. Note that on
the scholars' view the last sentence of Paragraph 2 is superfluous,
whereas under the American view it is needed.
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5. I debated whether to include this. It would apply to such things as
capital punishment for being found with a gun, or a year's imprison-
ment for curfew violation. If I am right in thinking some clandestine
forces are worthy of respect, it does not seem that a person who
thinks he belongs to such a force should be shot for possessing a gun
before he does anything with it. He should be at least as well off as a
common bank robber. The words "emergency measures inap-
propriate in a peaceful society" are intended to refer to measures
that a government regards as temporary and justifies on the basis of
extraordinary circumstances brought about by war or civil unrest.
See, e.g., Northern Ireland (Emergency Provision) Act, 1973.
Article 3
This Article represents my perceptions of the applicable moral prin-
ciples. Some of the principles on which I have operated are that in wars
fought over economic and social conditions the people responsible for the
conditions should be at least as vulnerable as the common soldiers and
police; that disguise is not inherently objectionable but abuse of human
encounter is; that no one should have to feel that anyone he encounters
at any time may be going to kill him; that a person's contribution to a
peaceful solution should not be a ground for making an enemy of him,
etc.
1. (a) and (b) are meant to distinguish between regular armed forces
and police. The situation I have in mind with (c) is that of a sheriff
about to evict a peasant from his farm, or a construction crew about
to bulldoze a house. It is not meant to authorize a massacre of a
legislative body about to enact an oppressive law or a board of direc-
tors about to pass an oppressive policy. The last sentence is meant to
protect participants in a court proceeding where a prisoner is in
custody and about to be marched off to jail. It would not be neces-
sary to protect participants in a court proceeding where an eviction
order is about to be handed down. They would not be "actively using
or threatening to use force." (d) corresponds to the notion of "quasi-
combatant work force" that is used in connection with strategic
bombing.
3. See note 77 supra. The text is intended to embody my intuitive
distinction between fraternizing to obtain information and fraterniz-
ing to prepare for attack. This is meant for the most part to replace,
rather than to supplement, existing material on perfidy, although
rules such as that against misusing the red cross marking or the flag
of truce would continue to apply. Rather than spell out the relation
with the existing material, I am relying on the general provision of
Article 1, Section 2 that the existing material applies except where
it is superseded.
4- These matters are all covered in the existing material.
5.
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Article 4
This Article is meant to deal with the fact that clandestine forces
generally have no facilities for holding prisoners. Compulsory parole is a
serious departure from existing practice, but it seems appropriate here.
The forty-eight hours to one week requirement is to keep the use from
getting out of hand. At least as recently as our Civil War, the refusal of
quarter was considered acceptable where a commander could not en-
cumber himself with prisoners without endangering his own force.
LIEBER, supra note 14, art. 60. The modern rule is different, AFM, supra
note 14, § 85, but, given the dilemma of a clandestine force with
prisoners, revival of the earlier practice in the case of a prisoner who
will not accept the proferred alternative of parole does not seem unduly
harsh.
Article 5
Redressing grievances and punishing oppressors is a way, and in my
opinion a legitimate way, for a clandestine force to gain adherents in the
community. But it should be done with such procedural safeguards as
are possible during a clandestine operation.
Article 6
This Article represents my moral judgment on various expedients
used in the Boer War, World War II, Algeria, Malaya, Cyprus, Palestine,
and Vietnam. Many of these are also covered in the existing material,
but it seemed appropriate to mention them specifically here, as they
seem to be particularly adapted for use against clandestine forces.
Article 7
The existing material covers procedures at length, so there is no
need for elaboration here.
Article 8
The existing material covers punishments in scattered locations, that
make it difficult to cite by reference. The restrictions on the death penal-
ty and on the manner of punishment are similar to the existing material,
although not verbatim. The provision for corporal punishment seems
essential for forces that have no facilities for keeping prisoners. The pro-
vision for conditional suspension of sentences gives the government
some maneuvering room where the clandestine force attempts to coerce
the release of detained members. It would also permit a clandestine




I do not feel that a clandestine force that is not supporting a conven-
tional force is entitled to claim recognition as a belligerent from third
parties or to insist that third parties treat its enemies as belligerents.
The PLO should not be able to demand that all nations stop selling arms
to Israel. Still less should the Symbionese Liberation Army be able to
demand that American forces in Germany be interned. On the other
hand, the force opposing the clandestine force should have the right to
demand that third parties not supply the clandestine force or allow it
free access to neutral territory.
Article 10
The existing material forbids belligerents to use neutral territory,
and forbids neutrals to allow them to do so. The neutral may use force to
defend its neutrality, but I do not find that it is obliged to risk the lives of
its own troops to prevent violations of its neutrality. It stands to reason,
though, that a state that cannot keep one belligerent out has no right to
keep the other out.
Appendix II
DRAFT FEDERAL ACT CONCERNINGARMED ORGANIZATIONS
Section 1: Definitions
As used in this Act:
(a) "Armed organization" means an organized body of persons that has
used or threatened to use deadly force in the service of a foreign
government or in the pursuit of a political objective, and that may be
expected to continue doing so.
(b) "Military authority" means any person now or hereafter empowered
to convene a general court martial, subject to such limitations as the
President may establish.
(c) "The laws and customs of war" includes the provisions of any inter-
national agreement to which the United States is a party, whether
or not the armed organization involved in any case is a party or is
acting on behalf of a party. In determining the eligibility of any per-
sons for treatment as a prisoner of war, each such agreement shall
be applied as if the armed organization to which that person belongs
were acting on behalf of a party to that agreement.
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Section 2: Treatment of Members of Armed Organizations
Any member of an armed organization as defined in Section 1 may
be dealt with in accordance with this act and with the laws and customs
of war. At the option of the military authority detaining him he may be
dealt with in any of the following ways:
(a) He may be held as a prisoner of war until it shall be determined by
the President or by a court in accordance with the provisions of this
Act that the armed organization to which he belongs has disbanded
or no longer fulfills the definition in Section 1.
(b) If he is found by a military commission to be guilty of a crime against
the laws and customs of war, he may be sentenced to death or such
lesser punishment as the military commission may determine.
(c) If he is found by a military commission to be ineligible for prisoner of
war status under the laws and customs of war, the military commis-
sion may impose on him any sentence authorized by Act of Congress
or by the laws and customs of war as understood and applied in the
courts of the United Stated, provided, that no one may be sentenced
to death under this subsection unless he is proved to have committed
an overt act in aid of the use of deadly force by the armed organiza-
tion to which he belongs.
(d) If the civil authorities desire to prosecute him for a crime or crimes,
he may be turned over to them, subject to the provisions of Section
4.
(e) He may be released either absolutely or subject to any condition not
inconsistent with the laws and customs of war.
Section 3: Arrest and Detention of Members of Armed Organizations
(a) A military authority may arrest and detain without warrant any per-
son found armed and suspected of being a member of an armed or-
ganization. He may arrest and detain any other person so suspected
upon a duly issued warrant. With respect to any such person, he
shall have the same power as an agent of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation to apply for a warrant. Probable cause to believe that a
person is a member of an armed organization shall be probable cause
for issuance of a warrant for that person's arrest.
(b) If a person detained pursuant to subsection (a) of this Section admits
that he is a member of an armed organization or is otherwise subject
to the laws and customs of war, the military authority detaining him
shall deal with him in accordance with Section 2. If he does not make
such an admission, the military authority detaining him shall forth-
with bring him before a court with jurisdiction to issue a writ of
habeas corpus, and the court shall proceed in accordance with Sec-
tion 5. If the court remands the person to the custody of the military
authority, the military authority shall then deal with him in accor-
dance with Section 2.
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Section 4: Persons Accused of Civil Crimes
(a) It is a defense to any criminal prosecution in any court, state or
federal, other than a military commission or a court martial, that the
accused is a member of an armed organization and that the act con-
stituting the alleged crime was carried out in pursuit of the goals of
that organization and was not a violation of the laws and customs of
war. In any case in which this defense is successfully established, the
court, instead of releasing-the accused, shall cause him to be turned
over to a military authority to be dealt with in accordance with Sec-
tion 2. Provided, that he shall not be tried under subsection (b) of
Section 2 for any act found by the court not to be a violation of the
laws and customs of war.
(b) If in the course of any criminal investigation or proceeding it shall
appear that the accused may have been acting as a member of an
armed organization, the court or the prosecuting or investigating
authority shall promptly notify a military authority. If the investiga-
tion or proceeding is for any reason terminated otherwise than by
the conviction and sentencing of the accused, the court or the prose-
cuting or investigating authority shall cause him to be turned over
to a military authority to be dealt with in accordance with Section 2
or Section 3.
(c) If in the course of any criminal investigation or proceeding the accus-
ed shall raise the defense provided for in subsection (a) of this Sec-
tion, or shall claim in any other way that his case should be dealt
with in accordance with the laws and customs of war, his claim or
defense shall be taken as constituting the admission provided for in
subsection (b) of Section 3.
Section 5: Habeas Corpus
(a) Any court with jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a
United States military officer may issue such a writ to test the
legality of the detention of any person under this Act. In proceed-
ings on such a writ, if the prisoner is being detained otherwise than
under sentence of a military commission under the provisions of sub-
section' (b) of Section 2, he shall be released unless the court is
satisfied that at the time of his capture he was a member of an arm-
ed organization, and that the armed organization has not disbanded
or ceased to fulfill the definition in Section 1. If the prisoner is being
detained under sentence of a military commission under the provi-
sions of subsection (b) of Section 2, he shall be released unless the
court is satisfied that at the time of his capture he was a member of
an armed organization, that the proceedings of the military commis-
sion were regular, and that the sentence was justified by the law and
the facts.
(b) In any proceeding under this Section, the burden of proof shall be on
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the detaining military authority, except that if the legality of a per-
son's detention has been established in such a proceeding (other than
a proceeding before a military commission under subsection (c)) with-
in the previous eighteen months, the burden shall be on the person
detained to establish changed circumstance.
(c) During such time as the writ of habeas corpus is lawfully suspended,
a military commission may make the determination provided for in
this Section in any case arising under subsection (b) of Section 3.
During such time for ninety days thereafter, no sentence of death
may be executed under this Act.
Section 6: Release of Prisoners
If the President or a court or military commission in a proceeding
under Section 5 shall determine that an armed organization has disbanded
or no longer fulfils the definition in Section 1, anyone detained as a mem-
ber of that armed organization, including persons sentenced under subsec-
tion (c) of Section 2, but not including persons sentenced under subsec-
tion (b) of Section 2, shall be released.
Section 7: Death Penalty
No sentence of death shall be passed on any person under the age of
eighteen, or who was under that age when captured or when the offense
was committed, or on any pregnant woman or any mother with depen-
dent children. No sentence of death may be executed without the ex-
press individual approval of the President nor until the expiration of
ninety days (or such longer time as may be provided in any applicable in-
ternational agreement) after sentencing.
Section 8: Miscellaneous
(a) Laws governing the constitution, procedure, and appellate review of
general courts martial shall be applied as far as possible to military
commissions under this Act.
(b) Prisoners of war detained pursuant to this Act shall be entitled to
the rights provided for such prisoners under the Geneva Convention
of 1949 and the 1977 Protocol thereto, except that no Protecting
Power shall be admitted except in a case where the United States is
obliged under an applicable international agreement to admit one.
(c) Laws governing appellate review and stay of judgment shall apply in
proceedings under Section 5 as in other civil cases.
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